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Abstract
This paper argues that regulatory agencies have a responsibility to further the public 
interest when they determine the conditions under which new technological prod-
ucts may be commercialized. As a case study, this paper analyzes the US 9th Circuit 
Court’s ruling on the efforts of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to 
regulate an herbicide meant for use with seed that are genetically modified to be 
tolerant of the chemical. Using that case, it is argued that when regulatory agencies 
evaluate new technological products, they have an obligation to draw on data, analy-
ses, and evaluations from a variety of credible epistemic sources, and not rely solely 
or even primarily on the technology developer. Otherwise, they create conditions for 
their own domination and that of the polity by the technology developer. Moreover, 
in the interest of advancing the public interest, regulatory agencies must evaluate 
new technologies in a substantively and procedurally unbiased manner.
Keywords Regulatory agencies · Patents · Public interest · Epistemic monopoly · 
Domination · Epistemic responsibilities · Genetically engineered seed · Dicamba
1 Introduction
It seems uncontroversial that regulatory agencies (as agents of the democratic state) 
have a responsibility to further the public interest when they determine the condi-
tions under which new technological products may be commercialized. However, it 
is not obvious what qualifies as the public interest and why regulatory agencies have 
a duty to foster it. Drawing on the work of political philosophers, this paper identi-
fies some of the responsibilities of regulatory agencies. The argument is made that 
regulatory agencies should not create or condone epistemic monopolies that enable 
technology developers to dominate them or the polity. Otherwise, they violate their 
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duty as state actors to advance the public interest when they regulate new techno-
logical products.
Regulatory agencies determine the conditions under which a variety of products, 
including technological products, may be commercialized. For instance, the range of 
entities and objects over which US regulatory agencies have purview is broad and 
varied. It includes milk, viruses, biologics, tobacco products, cosmetics, genetically 
modified1 plants and animals, pharmaceuticals, and pesticides. Among other things, 
regulatory agencies are responsible for setting conditions for the safe and effective 
use of those organisms and objects as products.
As a case study, this paper analyzes the US 9th Circuit Court’s ruling on the 
efforts of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate dicamba, an 
herbicide. In 2016, the EPA issued a 2-year permit for the commercial use of three 
newly developed formulations of dicamba that were designed for use with seed 
that are genetically modified to be tolerant of the chemical. In 2018, the regulatory 
agency extended the commercial use permit for those new formulations of dicamba 
for another 2 years. It made that decision even though by then there were numer-
ous credible public reports that the chemical drifted beyond the farm fields it was 
applied in, causing significant harm to off-site, non-target plants, bushes, and trees.
The EPA’s 2018 decision to renew the permit for the newly developed versions 
of dicamba motivated three civil society organizations to file a complaint with the 
US 9th Circuit Court. In June 2020, the Court vacated the 2018 decision of the EPA 
to extend the commercial use permit for the three new formulations of dicamba. 
This paper analyzes the Court ruling because dicamba use has national and inter-
national significance. It is expected that the seed genetically modified to be tolerant 
of dicamba and the newly developed versions of dicamba meant for use with them 
are likely to achieve the same degree of market dominance in the USA as geneti-
cally modified seed that are modified to have the trait that makes them tolerant of 
glyphosate (an herbicide) and glyphosate itself2 (National Family Farm Coalition v. 
EPA, 2020, 48). Agrochemical companies that produce GE glyphosate-tolerant seed 
and glyphosate-based herbicides need a replacement for glyphosate. Weeds3 have 
become resistant to the chemical.4
To appreciate the market dominance of agrochemical companies’ GE crops 
(and the herbicides and pesticides that are intended for use with them) and what 
that means for dicamba, it is useful to consider the data compiled by the Economic 
Research Service of the US Department of Agriculture (USDA). Currently, more 
than 90% of US corn, upland cotton, and soybeans are GE varieties (ERS, USDA 
1 The terms “genetically modified” and “genetically engineered” are used interchangeably to denote 
organisms that have been modified by means of techniques of modern biotechnology.
2 Glyphosate has been the most widely applied pesticide on the planet (Benbrook, 2016). For a recent 
comprehensive overview of the scientific studies on the effect of glyphosate-based herbicides on the 
human endocrine system and its impact on other animal species, see Krimsky (2021).
3 The term “weeds” as used here refers to plants that are considered undesirable by farmers.
4 See Ravet et al. (2020), Loddo et al. (2020), and Gaines et al. (2020) reports for glyphosate resistance 
in North America, Europe, and South America, respectively.
1 3
Regulations Matter: Epistemic Monopoly, Domination, Patents,…
2020). The four other top cultivators of GE crops are Brazil, Argentina, Canada, 
and India. In 2019, along with the USA, they had 91% of the global GE crop area 
(approximately 190.4 million hectares) (ISAAA 2019). While only Spain and Por-
tugal in the European Union cultivate GE crops, a number of other European coun-
tries import GE crops that they use primarily as feed. Of the more than 30 million 
metric tons (MT) of soybeans and soybean products imported by the EU, approxi-
mately 90–95% were genetically engineered, of the 10 to 20 million MT of imported 
maize products, an estimated 20–25% were genetically modified, and of the 2.5 to 
5 million MT of imported rapeseed products, approximately 25% were genetically 
engineered (ISAAA 2019). The point here is that if GE dicamba-tolerant seed and 
the three newly developed versions of dicamba replace glyphosate-tolerant seed and 
glyphosate-based herbicides in countries that cultivate GE crops, it will be interna-
tionally significant.
This paper analyzes the 9th Circuit Court’s ruling with the aim of identifying 
some of the key duties of regulatory agencies that have purview over new techno-
logical products. It argues that when regulatory agencies choose to rely primarily 
or entirely on product sponsors for data, analyses, and evaluations, they in effect 
voluntarily subject themselves to an epistemic monopoly. In doing that, they cre-
ate conditions for their own domination by those actors. Regulatory agencies should 
guard against being dominated because that may compromise their ability to foster 
the public interest (more on this later).
As agents of the democratic state charged with advancing the public interest, 
regulatory agencies also have a duty to not permit or participate in the domination 
of the polity. Not being dominated qualifies as a matter of public interest. Public 
interest is an interest that all persons have qua members of a democratic society (see 
Barry (1964), cited in O’Flynn (2010) and Boot (2020)). It is not specific to one’s 
particular roles, be it as a parent, laborer, etc. (Barry, 1964, 14). The public interest 
is also not equivalent to the notion of the common good that communitarians invoke 
and which assumes a shared thick conception of the good life, nor is it to be under-
stood as the aggregate of the particular interests that persons have in their specific 
roles.5
Regulatory agencies have at least three epistemic duties to prevent powerful 
industries or corporate actors from dominating them or the polity. First, they must 
assess new technological products by drawing on data, analyses, and evaluations 
from a variety of credible sources and especially those who have been harmed or 
could be put at risk by the commercial use of those products. If regulatory agencies 
voluntarily substantively (or wholly) depend on product sponsors, they, in effect, 
chose to subject themselves to an epistemic monopoly. Their complete or signifi-
cant epistemic dependency on the product sponsor may undermine their ability to 
accurately evaluate the safety and effectiveness of technological products. Second, 
the duty to accurately assess products also requires that regulatory agencies keep 
product developers at an arm’s length. Third, regulatory agencies must evaluate 
5 The conception of public interest as the aggregate of the particular interests of persons is attributed to 
Jeremy Bentham, and it is termed “compositionalism” (see Boot (2020) for a critique of it).
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products in a procedurally disinterested manner that advances the public interest.6 
By analyzing these epistemic duties of regulatory agencies, this paper participates 
in the larger philosophical discussion about the responsibilities of regulatory bodies 
in democracies (see, for instance, Jasanoff, 2011; Meghani, 2014; Meghani, 2017; 
Meghani, 2019; Smuha, 2020; Floridi, 2021; Taylor, 2021).
The paper begins with a discussion of what it means for regulatory agencies to 
be autonomous. Then, the duty of the democratic state to further the public interest 
is analyzed and an account of public interest is extracted from it. Using that notion 
of public interest, the responsibilities of government agencies charged with regulat-
ing new technological products are explicated. After that, the EPA’s regulation of 
dicamba is briefly described. The June 2020 ruling of the 9th Circuit Court against 
the agency is also delineated. Following that, the Court’s ruling is analyzed. The 
final section of the paper identifies issues that remain unresolved.
2  Autonomy of Regulatory Agencies
Any account of the ethical duties of organizations should be cognizant of their 
capacity to function autonomously. An organization can be said to be autonomous if, 
among other things, it has the authority and resources to function in a manner that is 
in accordance with its mission and principles.
In the domain of ethics, individuals are construed as autonomous agents if they 
have the capacity to engage in self-determination (see, for instance, Immanuel Kant, 
Marilyn Friedman, and John Christman on that subject).7 Ethical theories conceptu-
alize such individuals as autonomous even if they choose not to exercise that capac-
ity. Autonomy is about having the ability to engage in self-determination. Ideally, 
they should exercise that capacity and choose to act ethically.
This paper contends that autonomy for regulatory agencies means something very 
different from autonomy for individuals. Unlike individuals, regulatory agencies 
must exercise their capacity to be self-determining, with the end of furthering the 
public interest. That is because as agents of democratic states regulatory agencies 
have a fundamental ethical and political duty to foster the public interest. However, 
their responsibility is limited to the domain over which they have authority (see, for 
instance, Shapiro (2012) and Barkow (2010)).
Regulatory agencies must function in a substantively and procedurally disinter-
ested manner such that their rules, policies, guidances, decisions, practices, and 
actions further the public interest. The autonomy of regulatory agencies is tethered 
7 Immanuel Kant (1785 [1983]) conceptualizes autonomous persons as those who are capable of for-
mulating and abiding by universal moral laws. In contrast, Marilyn Friedman (2003) has argued that an 
autonomous person is able to reflect on their deeper values and concerns and act in accordance with them 
even if they face some minimal degree of opposition by others. Their decision qualifies as autonomous 
if it is made by them on the basis of their values and concerns, without undue manipulation or coercion 
from others.
6 This is not a comprehensive account of public interest, rather it is one sufficient for the purposes of this 
paper.
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to and shaped by their responsibility to foster the public interest. So regulatory agen-
cies, unlike individuals, are obligated to act in an autonomous manner because they 
have a duty to advance the public interest. In other words, acting in an autonomous 
manner with respect to their responsibilities is a requirement for regulatory entities. 
It is not a matter of choice.
Regulatory agencies invariably face constraints, such as inadequate funding, as 
they attempt to advance the public interest, including attend to their mission. The 
ability of those organizations to do what they are supposed to do may also be cur-
tailed by onerous and unrealistic requirements, especially if they are inadequately 
funded. For instance, the original and revised Toxic Substances Control Acts have 
placed on the US EPA enormous data collection and resource demands that has 
undermined the ability of the perpetually underfunded agency8 to protect pub-
lic health and the environment (see Krimsky (2017) for a detailed analysis of this 
problem).
The autonomy of regulatory entities is shaped and constrained by their socio-
political circumstance, including institutional context. In the USA, for instance, the 
institutional environment of federal regulatory agencies comprises of the legislative, 
executive, and judicial branches of the government (Croley, 2007; Magill, 2011). 
Theoretically speaking, the US Congress has virtually unlimited authority over reg-
ulatory agencies that is curtailed only by the Constitution (Magill, 2011). The Presi-
dent’s authority over agencies has less scope than that of the legislative branch. The 
judiciary’s oversight even more constrained: it is limited by statute (Magill, 2011).
To protect the autonomy of regulatory agencies and to prevent legislators from 
forcing them to serve corporate or industry interests rather than the public inter-
est, limits on legislative control over regulatory bodies have been proposed (Croley, 
2007, 74–75). Judicial review and presidential oversight may also protect regula-
tory agency autonomy “from legislators and interest groups who seek regulation that 
favors narrow interests,” which would undermine the ability of regulatory bodies to 
further the public interest (Croley, 2007, 73).
The next section develops an account of public interest by drawing on the politi-
cal philosophy and public administration scholarship about the responsibilities of 
the democratic state. It is then used to argue that regulatory agencies have an obliga-
tion to rigorously evaluate new technological products.
3  The Public Interest and the Democratic State
The ethical justification for the existence and authority of the democratic state is 
its commitment to advance the public interest. “Public interest” is at heart a moral 
notion, which is “principally concerned with the proper conduct of political life in 
democracies in general and the proper ways of making collectively binding political 
decisions in particular” (O’Flynn, 2010, 300). Barry (1964) has proposed that public 
8 See Harrison (2011, 101–103) on the EPA’s inadequate budget.
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interest should be understood as the interest that all persons have qua members of a 
democratic society that is committed to the moral equality of all human beings.
Historically, liberal political philosophy has tended to equate the state’s obli-
gation to foster the public interest with respect for the political and civil rights of 
individuals. That notion of public interest has been subject to considerable criticism 
because of its limited conception of rights. Critics have argued that there is more to 
furthering the public interest than respect for individual civil and political rights. 
Rather the democratic state must also recognize and advance the economic rights of 
persons.
Some critics of the traditional liberal notion of the public interest have taken the 
position that the duty of the state to advance the public interest should not be under-
stood in utilitarian terms. If the public interest is conceptualized in terms of actions 
(or inaction) by the state based on the preference of the majority (Ferdman & Kohn, 
2018), the minority is treated as if it matters less than the majority. That would vio-
late the key tenet of democracy: everyone matters and matters equally and thus has 
the same rights9 (Nielsen, 1985).
The traditional liberal conception of the public interest has also been subject to 
the criticism that it fails to recognize that justice requires that the state should not 
create or permit conditions that result in the exploitation (or some other form of 
domination) of social groups (Schwartzman, 2006; Young, 1990; 2002). The public 
interest is harmed if any social group is not treated fairly. Fairness is to be under-
stood as equitable treatment, rather than equal treatment. Providing the same amount 
and kinds of goods and services to all groups constitutes fair treatment only in the 
technical sense rather than in the substantive sense. If some groups have been or are 
exploited or marginalized, then merely providing them with the same goods and ser-
vices as other groups will not be sufficient to remedy for the harms they have expe-
rienced or endure. More must be done to ensure that their life prospects are on par 
with those of groups that have not been and are not subject to those injustices. So, 
what is needed is equitable treatment rather than equal treatment. The democratic 
state must treat all groups equitably (Schwartzman, 2006; Young, 1990; 2002).
The democratic state and its agents (such as regulatory agencies) also should not 
create conditions for or permit their own domination. They have a duty to shield 
themselves from domination by third parties. Otherwise, their ability to act autono-
mously in the public interest is compromised. The democratic state exists to serve 
the polity and it is accountable to them.
Theoretically speaking, the power that the democratic state has over the polity 
does not qualify as domination because the power is legitimate and qualified (Skin-
ner, 2002).10 In other words, the polity consented to being governed and it decided 
on the scope of the state’s power. There are limits to the power of the democratic 
10 A state that governs without the consent of the public and without limits that are decided by it fails to 
recognize and respect the autonomy of the members of the polity (Skinner 2002). They are at its mercy 
and even the mere knowledge of that dependency places psychological constraints on persons such that 
their capacity to engage in self-determination is undermined (Skinner 2002, 257). Such a state lacks ethi-
cal and political legitimacy.
9 For an account of this tension in J.S. Mill’s work, see, for instance, Lyons (1994) and Brink (2010).
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state; its power is not categorical. For instance, it does not have the right to exploit 
(some or all of) the polity. It is accountable to those over whom it has authority and 
it is obligated to be transparent to them. The democratic state must recognize that 
the polity must have say over all matters that effect it. If any of those conditions are 
not met, the state fails to be ethically and politically legitimate, and it does not foster 
the public interest. The polity may remove it from office if it oversteps its boundaries 
or betrays the trust placed in it.
The democratic state’s duty to advance the public interest includes an obligation 
to not harm it. Among other things, it means not creating or condoning conditions 
under which some organizations (say, corporations) acquire power over a segment 
(or the entirety) of the polity such that they are able to exploit it or dominate it in 
some other way (more on this below). Nor should democratic states or their agents, 
including regulatory agencies, create or condone states of affairs that allow other 
states or non-state actors to dominate them.
4  The Public Interest and the Responsibilities of Regulatory Agencies 
with Respect to New Technological Products
Regulatory agencies are part of and agents of the democratic state, so they share 
its duty to further the public interest. The particulars of their responsibility depend 
on their remit as regulatory bodies. For instance, to advance the public interest, an 
agency charged with protecting public health and the environment must correct 
environmental injustices (i.e., states of affairs when some social groups, relative to 
other groups, endure disproportionate risks or harms) (Liang et  al., 2020). If the 
agency creates or allows conditions to exist that result in environmental injustice, 
it harms the public interest. As discussed earlier, the public interest is harmed if 
any social group is not treated fairly. For that reason, government agencies have a 
responsibility to treat all social groups equitably (Guy & McCandless, 2012). So, 
state actors’ duty to serve the public interest is not merely a question of respect-
ing individual rights, rather it is also a matter of treating all social groups equitably 
(Svara & Brunet, 2005, 254).
The ability of regulatory agencies to advance the public interest can be under-
mined by branches of the government. When members of the legislative branch are 
persuaded by business interests to adopt weak regulations or not regulate certain 
technologies or industries, regulatory agencies are not able to effectively (or at all) 
advance the public interest (Magill, 2011; Shapiro, 2012).
When a regulatory agency is required by law to not permit corporate actors to 
acquire monopolistic control, but it does not do so, then it fails to meet its ethical 
and legal obligation. It harms the public interest because, in effect, it enables the 
domination of (some segment or the entirety of) the polity by those corporations.11 
11 For pragmatic arguments against market monopolies, see, for instance, IPES (2017) and Bratspies 
(2017). They make the case that monopolies make it very difficult for new companies to enter the market 
and undermine innovation efforts by other actors.
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When businesses become monopolies, they have disproportionate control over the 
marketplace such that members of the polity that need their products have to accept 
their terms. There are no viable alternatives for them. For instance, when a small 
group of corporations has proprietary rights over an agricultural biotechnology that 
farmers need to use, they can require them to accept their terms of sale whatever 
they may be. The 2017 report, Too Big to Feed, of the International Panel of Experts 
on Sustainable Food Systems (IPES) notes that
[t]oday, the proprietary seed industry is intimately linked to the world’s largest 
agrochemical corporations. Syngenta (Switzerland), Bayer (Germany), BASF 
(Germany), DuPont (USA), Monsanto (USA), and Dow (USA), known as the 
“Big Six,” currently control both 60% of the global seed market and 75% of 
the global pesticides market. (IPES-Food, 2017, 21)
In 2020, the “Big Six” consolidated into the “Big Four” with Bayer’s purchase 
of Monsanto, and the merger of the agrochemical biotechnology sections of DuPont 
and Dow into Corteva.12 The 2017 IPES report argued that the mega-mergers 
between chemical-agriculture companies “has made farmers ever more reliant on a 
handful of suppliers and buyers, further squeezing their incomes and eroding their 
ability to choose what to grow, how to grow it, and for whom” (p.5).
As agents of the democratic state, the duty to nurture the public interest is the 
primary end-in-itself for regulatory agencies. So, they should not be complicit in the 
domination of (some or all of) the polity. Moreover, as part of their duty to foster the 
public interest, they should perform their work in a substantively and procedurally 
disinterested manner.
The substantive disinterestedness criterion requires that regulatory agencies keep 
proponents and developers of technologies at an arm’s length. Citing Landis (1960), 
Latin (1991), and psychological studies, Shapiro (2012) notes that as industry repre-
sentative meet with regulatory agency personnel on a much more frequent basis than 
environmental groups, it has a psychological effect on those government employees 
(117–118). They shift towards the position of the regulated parties “no matter how 
sincere and public-spirited officials are when appointed” (Shapiro, 2012, 118). (Also 
see Harrison (2011, 103–107), and more recently, Lerner (2021), on industry influ-
ence at the EPA).
The need for regulatory agencies to keep parties whose products they regulate at 
an arm’s length is evident in the 2006 letter that the Local Presidents of (US) EPA 
Unions (representing thousands of scientists, risk managers, and related staff) sent to 
the EPA administrator.13 The letter expressed serious concern about the close rela-
tionship between the environmental agency personnel and the parties whose prod-
ucts they regulate, impairing the ability of the agency to attend to its mission of 
protecting human health and the environment:
12 For details and analyses of the Dow/DuPont, Bayer/Monsanto, and ChemChina/Syngenta mergers, see 
Bratspies (2017).
13 Cited in Harrison (2011, 105).
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Our colleagues in the (EPA’s) Pesticide Program feel besieged by political 
pressure exerted by Agency officials perceived to be too closely aligned with 
the pesticide industry and former EPA officials now representing the pesticide 
and agricultural community; and by the USDA through their Office of Pest 
Management Policy. Equally alarming is the belief among managers in the 
Pesticide and Toxics Programs that regulatory decisions should only be made 
after reaching full consensus with the regulated pesticide and chemicals indus-
try. (Welch et al., 2006)
If regulatory agencies do not or cannot keep product sponsors at an arm’s length, 
the public interest may be harmed and regulatory agencies might not be able to 
meet their particular obligations (see, for instance, Krimsky and Gillam’s (2018) 
analysis of Monsanto’s influence on the EPA and its product’s public health conse-
quences).14 For a detailed account of pesticide companies’ influence on EPA person-
nel, see Lerner 2021.
The substantive disinterestedness criterion also requires that regulatory agency 
not begin with the assumption that new technological products are valuable or use-
ful. For instance, with respect to agricultural biotechnology products, regulatory 
agencies must take an agnostic attitude towards the “goodness” of agricultural bio-
technologies in general and particular agricultural biotechnologies. They must not 
start with the belief that agricultural biotechnologies are good, regardless of their 
particulars or context of use.
In contrast to the substantive disinterestedness standard, the procedural disinter-
estedness criterion requires that regulatory agencies create and abide by protocols 
that enable them to rigorously evaluate new products. When evaluating two compet-
ing products, a regulatory agency must conduct procedurally unbiased assessments 
that foster the public interest. Not only should both products be subject to the equiv-
alent battery of safety tests, but the tests must have as their larger aim the public 
interest. To perform procedurally unbiased evaluations, regulatory agencies should 
also draw on a variety of credible resources for data, analyses, and evaluations of 
the new technological products. They should not solely or primarily depend on the 
technology developer.
There are a variety of epistemic (i.e., knowledge seeking and knowledge creating) 
procedures that regulatory agencies are able to use to conduct unbiased and rigorous 
risk assessments, with the end of making informed regulatory decisions about prod-
ucts. For instance, the US Food and Drug Administration and the EPA routinely use 
advisory committees to that end (Weimer, 2006, 571).
Legal scholar and US public administration expert Croley has detailed the proce-
dures that US regulatory agencies may and do use to get data, information, analyses, 
and evaluations about products:
14 Also see, Bird et al.’s (2021) review of the talc industry’s influence on the FDA; it is a detailed case 




[A]gencies have very robust processes for gathering and evaluating informa-
tion: They employ policy analysts, including economists, accountants, and sci-
entists. They rely on peer review. They also solicit advice from experts and 
other consultants. They convene advisory groups. They publicize their find-
ings and disclose other studies on which their proposals rely. In addition to all 
of that, agencies also often quantify the costs and benefits of proposed regula-
tory decisions, and invite interested parties to comment on the same. In short, 
regulatory agencies are not dependent upon regulated parties for either infor-
mation or expertise. The idea that regulated interests can fool agencies fails to 
consider the considerable infrastructure agencies have developed to generate 
and process information (2007, 236–237).
So, these are known epistemic standards and norms for regulatory agencies that 
have purview over technological products. Regulatory agencies’ autonomy (i.e., 
their ability to advance the public interest) is partially a function of their use of those 
procedures and resources.
If a regulatory agency’s protocol obligates it to draw solely (or primarily) on the 
data, analyses, or evaluations provided by the sponsor of the product or those who 
have a vested interest in it, then its decisions may be biased in favor of those inter-
ests (Croley, 2007, 75). For instance, when regulatory agencies wholly (or dispro-
portionately) rely on the developers of an agricultural biotechnology for evaluating 
the safety of and risks from their product, they compromise their ability to act for the 
public interest. Data, analyses, and evaluations from those who have been harmed 
or will be put at substantial risk from the product could help regulatory agencies 
appraise the safety of and risks from the biotechnology more rigorously (including 
accurately).
The importance of regulatory agencies not depending solely or mainly on prod-
uct sponsors or industry becomes clear when it is taken into account that there are 
cases of corporations and industries skewing studies and study results about their 
products, as well as not allowing negative results about their products to be pub-
lished (see, for instance, Lexchin (2012) and Bohme et al. (2005) for a general dis-
cussion and examples of this ethical and epistemic problem; see Tran et al. (2019) 
for a detailed case study). Developers of new technologies may also “frame” their 
products in peer-reviewed publications as the solution or a necessary part of any 
solution to a particular problem, even though that may be at odds with analyses 
developed by other scientific experts who are differently situated (see, for instance, 
Meghani, 2020). Fernández Pinto and Hicks (2019) note that some product spon-
sors and industries invoke unrealistic epistemic standards to discount research that 
is critical of their products and undermine efforts to regulate them effectively (see, 
for instance, McGarity, 2003; Oreskes and Conway, 2010; Proctor, 2012; Trasande 
et  al.,  2016). To get a grasp on the (public interest) value of regulatory agencies 
conducting rigorous assessments of risks from new technological products, it is illu-
minating to examine the 9th Circuit Court’s ruling in National Family Farm Coali-
tion v. US EPA. In June 2020, the Court found that the EPA did not attend to its 
legal responsibilities (which included epistemic duties) when it made the decision 
in October 2018 to extend the permit for the commercial use of lower volatility 
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formulations of dicamba, an herbicide meant for use with dicamba-tolerant GE seed. 
That affected the EPA’s ability to advance the public interest.
5  The Case of Dicamba
5.1  The EPA’s Regulation of Dicamba
Starting in the late 1990s, farmers in the USA increasingly used the herbicide 
glyphosate (the key ingredient in Monsanto’s Roundup brand name products) on 
their fields to kill weeds (National Family Farm Coalition v. EPA,  2020). The 
herbicide was meant for use with Monsanto’s genetically engineered (GE) cotton 
seed and GE soybean seed. The GE seed were modified to be tolerant of glypho-
sate and they had been de-regulated in the late 1990s by Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (APHIS), a regulatory agency within the US Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) that has oversight over GE plants. The herbicide did not 
affect the GE plants, but harmed plants that were not tolerant of it.
However, by the early 2000s, plants considered weeds by farmers had become 
tolerant of glyphosate. Presumably as a replacement for glyphosate, Monsanto 
chose dicamba, a different herbicide and began developing corn and soy that 
would be tolerant of it. At that time, dicamba had been available for decades in 
the US marketplace. However, it was not widely used on farms because of its 
volatility. It could drift as it was being sprayed if there was wind, it could also 
drift if it was applied in the midst of temperature inversion, and after application 
it could volatilize or change into vapor in hot weather and drift to areas where it 
was not supposed to be. When applied in farm fields, it would drift off-site and 
cause harm to non-target plants, bushes, and trees. It was known to have damaged 
fruit trees, tomato bushes, grapes, beans, peas, potatoes, flowers, and ornamental 
plants (Schroeder, 2020).
Monsanto developed and patented GE soybean and GE cotton that were modi-
fied to be tolerant of dicamba (henceforth, referred to as GE (DT) crops). Mon-
santo (now Bayer), Corteva (formerly DuPont), and BASF also developed for-
mulations of dicamba with reduced volatility, specifically, XtendiMax (Bayer), 
Engenia (BASF), and FeXapan (Corteva) (National Family Farm Coalition v. 
EPA, 2020, 8). Those three new formulations of dicamba were meant for use with 
Monsanto’s GE (DT) soybean and GE (DT) cotton plants.
In 2015, the USDA’s APHIS approved the use of Monsanto’s GE (DT) seed. 
Farmers began using them with the formulation of dicamba that was already on 
the market (National Family Farm Coalition v. EPA, 2020, 9).
The EPA has jurisdiction over pesticides and herbicides, including those 
intended for use with GE seed and crops. For commercial use, pesticides and 
herbicides must be registered with the agency. In 2016, pursuant to the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 et seq., the EPA 
granted conditional, 2-year registration to the three lower volatility formulations 
of dicamba sponsored by Monsanto (now Bayer), Corteva (formerly DuPont), and 
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BASF. The chemicals were meant for over the top (OTT) use on GE (DT) crops 
(National Family Farm Coalition v. EPA, 2020, 8–9).
The EPA justified its 2016 decision to register the dicamba formulations with 
lower volatility for commercial use on the grounds that if those chemicals were 
used according to the instructions on their label, the benefits would outweigh 
“any remaining minimal risks (from their use), if they exist at all” (EPA quote in 
National Family Farm Coalition v. EPA, 2020, 10). The EPA also stated that the 
restrictions on dicamba’s use were “expected to eliminate any offsite exposures” 
to the herbicide (EPA quote in National Family Farm Coalition v. EPA, 2020, 12). 
In other words, the agency seemed to assert that the three new lower volatility 
formulations of dicamba if used in accordance with the instructions on the label 
of their containers would guarantee that the chemical would not drift to areas 
where it was not supposed to be and cause off-target damage. The EPA approved 
the 2016 (initial) commercial registration of Monsanto’s lower volatility dicamba 
formulation drawing solely on the studies submitted by the company because 
“Monsanto did not at that time make its herbicide available for independent stud-
ies” (National Family Farm Coalition v. EPA, 2020, 28).
5.1.1  The 2017 Growing Season
In 2017, state-level agricultural agencies, various agricultural organizations, and the 
EPA itself received numerous complaints of dicamba drift damage to crops, plants, 
bushes, and trees that were not engineered to be dicamba tolerant (National Family 
Farm Coalition v. EPA 2020). Newspaper articles detailed complaints of dicamba 
drift from the neighbors of the farmers who planted GE (DT) crops in their fields 
and used dicamba on them. The drift meant that the principle of co-existence of 
different primary production systems was violated. Hubbard and Hassanein (2013) 
write that the principle refers to a “condition where different primary production 
systems can exist concurrently or in the vicinity of each other, and can be managed 
in such a way that they affect each other as little as possible.”
In response to “what the EPA characterized as high number of crop damage” dur-
ing the 2017 growing season, Monsanto offered to make changes to the label of its 
formulation of dicamba (National Family Farm Coalition v. EPA, 2020, 11). After 
consulting with state-level agencies and the USDA about the revisions to the label, 
the EPA approved additional restrictions on the use of the chemical.15 The key new 
(additional) conditions that farmers using the lower volatility versions of dicamba 
had to abide by were as follows (National Family Farm Coalition v. EPA, 2020, 13):
15 The agency introduced the additional restrictions without going through a formal registration amend-
ment process (National Family Farm Coalition v. EPA 2020, 11) or preparing a new risk assessment even 
though new evidence had emerged about the volatility of the herbicide’s new formulation (National Fam-
ily Farm Coalition v. EPA, 2020, 13–14).
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i. It was not to be applied if the wind speed was greater than 10 miles per hour 
(previously, it could be applied in wind speeds up to 15 miles per hour).
ii. It could only be applied between sunrise and sunset (previously, it could be 
applied at any time except during temperature inversion).
iii. It was to be labeled as “restricted use pesticides” and could only be applied 
by certified (dicamba) applicators or persons directly supervised by them.
5.1.2  The 2018 Growing Season
In 2018, in the USA, 56 million acres out of a total of 103 million acres of soybean 
and cotton were planted with Monsanto’s GE (DT) seed (National Family Farm 
Coalition v. EPA, 2020, 14). It was an increase of 29 million acres from the previous 
year devoted to the dicamba-tolerant GE seed. By July 15, 2018, university-affiliated 
scientists who study weeds calculated that approximately 1.1 million acres of soy-
bean (that were not dicamba tolerant) in 18 states had suffered damage from the 
herbicide (National Family Farm Coalition v. EPA, 2020, 14). In contrast, by July 
2017, university scientists had estimated 2.5 million acres of non-GE (DT) soybean 
were damaged by the herbicide (it is not known data from how many states was 
included in the figure). The lower amount of damage in 2018 was attributable to 
the EPA’s additional restrictions on the use of the herbicide as well as restrictions 
placed on the use of dicamba by individual states (see Table 1 for examples of state-
level (additional) restrictions on use of OTT dicamba (National Family Farm Coali-
tion v. EPA, 2020, 14–15)).16
Table 1  Examples of state-level (additional) restrictions on use of OTT dicamba




State-level restrictions (in addition to 
EPA’s restrictions) on the use of OTT 
dicamba herbicide during of OTT 
dicamba herbicide during the 2018 
growing season
Arkansas 986 200 OTT application of dicamba was pro-
hibited between April 16th–Oct 31st 
(i.e., the entire growing season)
Minnesota 250 29 i.  Before June 20th, OTT application of 
dicamba was forbidden on days when 
the temperature was greater than 85 °F 
(i.e., 29.44 °C)
ii.  After June 20th, OTT application of 
dicamba was forbidden
16 For a more detailed state by state response to dicamba drift damage, see National Family Farm Coali-
tion v. EPA, 2020, 14–16.
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Unlike Arkansas and Minnesota, during the 2018 growing season, Illinois relied 
solely on the EPA’s restrictions (on the label of containers of dicamba). In 2017, in 
Illinois, there were 245 complaints of dicamba drift harm (National Family Farm 
Coalition v. EPA, 2020, 16). In 2018, there were 330 complaints of drift damage to 
crops from dicamba for that state.
5.2  The EPA’s 2018 Decision to Extend the Commercial Use Permit for the Newly 
Developed Lower Volatility Formulations of Dicamba
While the damage from dicamba drift was well publicized and extensively docu-
mented, in October 2018, the EPA decided to extend its 2016 registration of the 
three lower volatility formulations of dicamba for another 2 years (i.e., 2019–2020). 
The agency justified its decision on the grounds that, first, the OTT (lower volatility 
formulations of) dicamba provided farmers with an additional means for controlling 
broadleaf weeds during the growing seasons, especially for significant weeds (such 
as Palmer amaranth) that were herbicide tolerant. Second, the lower volatility for-
mulations of dicamba were an additional tool for delaying the development of her-
bicide resistance in weeds if used during the length of the growing season (National 
Family Farm Coalition v. EPA, 2020, 16).
The EPA’s Oct 2018 decision to extend the commercial use permit of the three 
lower volatility formulations of dicamba referenced a slideshow from Monsanto’s 
2018 quarter financial results (National Family Farm Coalition v. EPA, 2020, 18). 
The agency stated that the company anticipated that 40 million acres of DT (GE) 
soybean would be planted on US farms. From that, the EPA estimated that 55% of 
non-DT (GE) soy crops could “potentially be damaged by very low levels of offtar-
get dicamba” (EPA, quoted in National Family Farm Coalition v. EPA, 2020, 18). 
The agency also acknowledged damage from dicamba drift to other plants, included 
“about 250 weeds—annual and perennial broadleaf plants and trees—…some of 
which are desirable in non-crop settings” (EPA, quoted in National Family Farm 
Coalition v. EPA, 2020, 18). However, the EPA did not quantify the damage.
In extending the (initial) commercial use permit for the three lower formulation 
versions of dicamba to the 2019–2020 period, the EPA introduced additional restric-
tions on their use. The ‘label’ for the lower volatility versions of dicamba was forty 
pages long (National Family Farm Coalition v. EPA, 2020, 43). It included the fol-
lowing stipulations about the chemical’s use on GE (DT) crops (National Family 
Farm Coalition v. EPA 2020, 19):
i. It could only be applied within one hour of sunrise or two hours prior to sun-
set (not at any time during the day).
ii. Only two OTT dicamba applications were permissible for each crop of DT 
(GE) soybeans (the second application had to occur within 45 days of planting).
iii. Only two OTT dicamba applications were allowable for each DT (GE) cot-
ton crop, with the second application within 60 days of planting.
iv. To protect certain plant species, a 57-ft buffer zone around the entire DT 
(GE) crop field was required in specific counties.
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The crucial question at that point in time was whether farmers could reasonably 
be expected to safely and legally use the chemical under the very restrictive condi-
tions specified on the label of containers of the lower volatility formulations of the 
herbicide. The EPA’s stipulation of those conditions, arguably, shifted the respon-
sibility of the safe and legal use of the herbicide from the manufacturer on to the 
shoulders of farmers who planted the GE (DT) seed (more on this below).
5.3  The 9th Circuit Court’s National Family Farm Coalition v. US EPA Ruling
Three civil society organizations voiced objection to the October 2018 EPA deci-
sion to extend the commercial use permit of the three lower-volatility formulations 
of dicamba. They sought judicial intervention on behalf of constituencies that had 
been harmed by the 2016 decision of the EPA to permit the commercial use of the 
newly developed lower volatility versions of dicamba. The National Family Farm 
Coalition, the Center for Food Safety, the Center for Biological Diversity, and the 
Pesticide Action Network North America filed a petition with the 9th Circuit Court 
asking for a judicial review of the agency’s decision. The EPA was the respondent, 
and Monsanto was the respondent-intervenor.
On June 3, 2020, the 9th Circuit Court ruled against the EPA. It vacated the 
agency’s 2018 decision that permitted the three-lower volatility dicamba formula-
tions to remain on the market. The ruling noted that the agency is required by law 
to take into account the social cost of the use of the product under review, but the 
EPA did not do so in its October 2018 dicamba decision. The Court concluded that 
the agency’s October 2018 decision to extend the registration of the lower volatility 
formulations of dicamba did not factor in the experience of farmers whose crops 
were damaged because their neighbors planted GE (DT) seed and used dicamba on 
them during the 2017 and 2018 growing seasons (National Family Farm Coalition 
v. EPA, 2020, 48–51). Dicamba drift created significant rips in “the social fabric of 
farming communities” because it damaged plants, crops, and trees that were not tol-
erant of it (National Family Farm Coalition v. EPA, 2020, 5).
According to the ruling, the EPA’s 2016 initial commercial use registration of the 
lower volatility dicamba versions and then the October 2018 extension of that permit 
(for another 2 years) created substantial risk of anti-competitive economic impact in 
the soybean and cotton industries (National Family Farm Coalition v. EPA, 2020, 
48–51). If a farmer used GE (DT) cotton or soybean, and thus, dicamba as herbicide, 
her neighbors who were farmers felt pressured to use the GE seeds modified to be 
tolerant of that chemical. Otherwise, their crops would be damaged if the herbicide 
drifted on to their fields when their neighbor used it on her fields. By not acknowl-
edging that the use of the herbicide by farmers made their neighbors who were farm-
ers feel that they had to switch to GE (DT) crops otherwise they would suffer very 
significant losses, the Court noted that the EPA was ignoring that a market monop-
oly of the herbicide and the GE (DT) seed was in the process of being established 
(National Family Farm Coalition v. EPA, 2020, 49). According to the 9th Circuit 
Court, the EPA was aware that Monsanto’s glyphosate-resistant trait, and glyphosate 
herbicide use “had achieved a near-monopoly” and that the patented GE (DT) seed 
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and the three lower volatility formulations of dicamba were likely to have the “same 
degree of dominance” (National Family Farm Coalition v. EPA, 2020, 48). Between 
2017 and 2018, Monsanto’s DT (GE) soybeans increased from 25% of US soybean 
to 50% (National Family Farm Coalition v. EPA,  2020, 48–49). The Court noted 
that the EPA is legally required to consider the possible anti-competitive impact of 
the products it reviews, but it did not attend to that responsibility in 2018 when it 
reviewed the application to extend the permit for dicamba’s commercial use. So, this 
was the second way in which the agency did not fulfil its epistemic duties.
The Court also criticized the EPA for not exercising its epistemic agency in a 
different regard. Specifically, in its October 2018 decision to extend the permit for 
the lower volatility dicamba, the EPA characterized the damage from the herbicide 
as “potential” and “alleged” even though “record evidence showed that dicamba 
had caused substantial and undisputed damage” (National Family Farm Coalition 
v. EPA, 2020, 5, 39). The Court noted that the agency failed “to quantify or esti-
mate the amount of damage caused by OTT application of dicamba herbicides, or 
even to admit that there was any damage at all” (National Family Farm Coalition v. 
EPA, 2020, 5, 39). The Court concluded that by late 2018 the EPA had both quanti-
tative and qualitative data of dicamba drift damage. For instance, the Acting Chief 
of the herbicide branch of the EPA’s Office of Pesticide Programs stated at a meet-
ing in Washington, D.C. in September 2017 with state regulatory officials that “the 
agency was ‘very concerned with what has occurred’ with the OTT (over-the-top) 
use of dicamba” (National Family Farm Coalition v. EPA, 2020, 12). At a Septem-
ber 2018 presentation, he “confirmed that ‘[m]ore than 3.6 million acres’ of soy-
beans had been damaged by dicamba during the 2017 season” (National Family 
Farm Coalition v. EPA, 2020, 12). The Court ruling noted that Acting Chief of the 
herbicide branch of the EPA’s Office of Pesticide Programs stated that that figure 
was probably an underestimate because state-level departments of agriculture did 
not receive all crop damage reports (National Family Farm Coalition v. EPA, 2020, 
12).
As the damage from dicamba drift was known to key EPA senior personnel 
and it was public knowledge, the Court stated that the EPA could have “quantified 
dicamba damage, even if it could not have calculated with precision the reduction in 
yield caused by the damage” (National Family Farm Coalition v. EPA, 2020, 39). It 
should have factored that information in its 2018 decision about the permit exten-
sion of the herbicide, but it chose not to do so.
The EPA’s strategy of stipulating increasingly specific and restrictive conditions 
for legal use of the lower volatility versions of dicamba (i.e., 40 pages of regula-
tion by labeling) did not advance the public interest. It shifted the responsibility of 
safe and legal use of the chemical on to the shoulders of individual farmers, while 
allowing the product sponsors to keep selling and growing its market share of the 
herbicide and the GE (DT) seed. It also meant that risks and harms continued to 
be imposed on the neighbors and communities of farmers who used the herbicide 
because of the possibility of damage from dicamba drift to plants, bushes, and trees 
that were not tolerant of the chemical. Those risks and harms were foisted on those 
neighbors and communities: they did not consent to undertake them. The case could 
be made that the EPA’s decision to renew the permit for the three newly developed 
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formulations of dicamba created conditions for their domination. Arguably, the 
agency’s ‘regulation’ of dicamba drift can be seen as part of a pattern of pesticide 
drift regulation in general, including pesticides that cause illness in humans (for a 
detailed analysis of the history of the problem of pesticide drift in the USA, see Har-
rison (2011)). Some constituencies are compelled to bear risks and harms; they have 
little or no say in the matter.
6  An Analysis of the 9th Circuit Court’s Ruling
The Court’s ruling is a rebuke to the EPA for not attending to its ethical and legal 
duties, which included the epistemic obligation to rigorously (including accurately) 
evaluate the safety of and risks from products. As noted in the ruling, the EPA 
should have taken into account the anti-competitive effect of the use of the dicamba 
formulations. By not acknowledging that the use of the herbicide by farmers made 
their neighbors who were farmers feel that they had to switch to GE (DT) crops oth-
erwise they would suffer very significant losses, the EPA was ignoring that a market 
monopoly of the product (i.e., dicamba) and the GE (DT) seed was in the process 
of being established. As discussed earlier, when a regulatory agency is legally obli-
gated to take into account in its risk evaluations and decisions the possible anti-com-
petitive impact of products, but chooses not to do so, it violates its duty to further 
the public interest. Arguably, it becomes complicit in monopolistic control of the 
marketplace by corporate actors, to the detriment of the public interest.
Another crucial problem noted by the 9th Circuit Court, but whose root cause 
was not addressed by it, was the EPA’s exclusive reliance on the product sponsor for 
data, analysis, and evaluation of the new lower volatility formulation of dicamba. 
According to the 9th Circuit Court, in 2016, the agency relied solely on Monsan-
to’s safety and risk data for its (initial) risk assessment and registration decision; the 
company had refused to provide its product to other parties (presumably, scientists 
and organizations concerned about the chemical) for independent studies (National 
Family Farm Coalition v. EPA, 2020, 28).
This is not an isolated instance of over (or complete) reliance of the agency on 
product sponsor. Regarding the EPA’s history of extensive epistemic reliance on 
industry, Harrison (2011) writes, “Congress and the EPA’s own scientists have criti-
cized the agency consistently since at least the 1960s for not verifying the validity of 
those industry data, and industry has been found to have withheld data showing that 
particular chemicals under review (and in use) pose serious health hazards” (99).
One possible way to prevent this problem would be for the EPA to issue guid-
ance documents that clarify to the agrochemical and agribiotechnology industry 
that before they apply for commercial permits for their products, they should make 
their products available for independent studies to third parties that are not affiliated 
with them or dependent on them (in any way). While guidance documents, includ-
ing those issued by the EPA, are usually not legally binding, they carry consider-
able weight because regulatory agencies routinely use them to provide industry with 
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their current thinking on specific issues (EPA (undated)). Some guidance documents 
describe the agency’s interpretation of policy, including the design, production, 
labeling, promotion, manufacturing, and testing of regulated products. Guidance 
documents may also detail inspection and enforcement policies (FDA, 2016).17
By issuing a guidance to the agrochemical and agribiotechnology industry that 
they should make their products available for study to third-party university sci-
entists and civil society organization scientists who are not affiliated or dependent 
on them in any way, the EPA would only be ensuring that it could abide by the 
epistemic norms for regulatory agencies. After all, it is a well-established and long-
standing norm and practice for US regulatory agencies to draw on a variety sources 
for data, analyses, and evaluations of the products under review (Croley, 2007, 
236–237). The ability of environmental agencies to make informed regulatory deci-
sions that further the public interest is enhanced when they have access to data, anal-
yses, and evaluations of products and their risks from a variety of credible sources, 
and not just the product sponsors.
The ruling also left untouched another serious epistemic and ethical problem with 
the regulation of new technological products. Regulatory agencies have the discretion 
to decide what weight they will give in their decisions to the data, analyses, or evalua-
tions developed by constituencies other than the product sponsor. Among other things, 
that means they have the latitude to discount the epistemic contributions of those who 
are independent third parties or those who have been harmed (or will be put at risk) by 
the commercial use of the technological product. Those contributions have a particular 
epistemic value because they have the potential to be crucial correctives to the data, 
analyses, and evaluations provided to regulatory agencies by product sponsors. How-
ever, under the current regulatory system, the EPA (as in the case of the lower volatil-
ity formulations of dicamba) has the discretion to determine how much weight it will 
give to those contributions in its decisions about new technologies.
According to the 9th Circuit Court, the decision of the EPA to not accurately 
estimate the dicamba damage in the face of record evidence, in effect, amounted to 
a refusal of the EPA to attend to its responsibility as a regulatory agency charged 
with accurately evaluating harms and risks from new technological products. If 
there is substantial evidence of harm or risk from a product, regulatory agencies are 
obligated to at least estimate the damage and factor that into their decision-making 
about whether to permit the product to remain on the market. If a regulatory agency 
does not act on such information, it violates its duty to further the public interest. 
(Not harming public interest is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of advanc-
ing the public interest.) The Court considered that the EPA should have acted on its 
obligation to furthering the public interest by making an informed decision about 
extending the permit for the new technological product. Specifically, it should have 
taken into consideration relevant data, analyses, and evaluation that were widely 
available to it from credible sources about the harms and risks from dicamba use. 
The EPA should have been particularly attentive and responsive to constituen-
cies who had been harmed by or were at significant risk from those products. That 
would have enabled it to accurately and more rigorously evaluate the lower volatility 
17 For a history of the changes in the legal status of guidance documents, see Noah (1997).
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formulations of the herbicide, and then make an informed decision about whether to 
extend their registration for another 2 years.
The 9th Circuit Court’s June 2020 ruling was a stern rebuke to the EPA. How-
ever, its impact on the agency is unclear. Three months after the ruling, in October 
2020, the EPA approved the registration of two new dicamba products and extended 
the registration of other dicamba formulations until 2025. The registration included 
new control measures intended to ensure their effective use while “protecting the 
environment, including non-target plants, animals, and other crops not tolerant to 
dicamba” (EPA, 2020). Key agency personnel justified their decision on the grounds 
that it would give farmers the certainty they needed for the next (i.e., 2021) grow-
ing season, and the agency made the decision after “reviewing substantial amounts 
of new information, conducting scientific assessments based on the best available 
science, and carefully considering input from stakeholders” (EPA, 2020). The 2021 
growing season will be telling.
Next, three unresolved issues are delineated.
7  Unresolved Issues
The 9th Circuit Court’s decision (to vacate the lower volatility formulations of 
dicamba commercial use permit’s extension) brings to light three key underlying 
unresolved problems with the regulation of new technologies. First, judicial over-
sight of regulatory agencies is a chancy matter. Those who have been harmed or 
might be put at significant risks from a technological product that has been approved 
or de-regulated must have (legal) standing for the courts to take up their request 
for review of an agency’s decision. Stewart has argued that by the mid-1970s, US 
administration law underwent key doctrinal changes.18 Statutes widened the classes 
of interests that had legal standing in formal agency processes. The federal courts 
were increasingly willing to scrutinize agency actions. A broader range of interests 
were recognized by the courts as having standing under the Constitution to request 
administrative hearings. The federal courts recognized that a larger class of inter-
ests had legal standing to request judicial review of decisions made by regulatory 
agencies.19
Those doctrinal changes are reassuring, but only to a degree. Depending on 
the political climate of the country, statutes could be enacted to narrow the class 
of interests that have legal standing to initiate judicial review of regulatory agency 
decisions. If that occurs, it could mean that if regulatory agencies did not protect 
themselves or the polity from domination by the developers of new technological 
products, the affected groups may not have access to the courts as a way of holding 
them responsible. For instance, if a regulatory agency chose not to exercise its epis-
temic agency (by drawing on data, analyses, and evaluations about a new techno-
logical product from a variety of sources), but instead decided to rely solely on the 
18 This analysis is drawn from Weimar’s analysis (2005) of Stewart (1975).
19 Also, see Jasanoff (2011) about the political circumstances under which this change occurred.
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technology developer, the affected groups and civil society organizations might not 
be able to hold them accountable. So, this is an intractable and significant problem 
with the regulation of new technological products in societies where power relations 
between groups are inequitable.
There is another serious problem that the dicamba case serves to illuminate. The 
ability of a regulatory agency to act autonomously so as to advance the public inter-
est may be constrained by the actions of other regulatory bodies. For instance, while 
the 9th Circuit Court’s decision applied to the EPA, the ruling can also be read as 
an indirect rebuke to the USDA, which, in 2015, de-regulated the use of GE (DT) 
crops, even though at that time, the EPA was in the process of reviewing the applica-
tions for the three new formulations of dicamba. It is an open question whether the 
USDA’s 2015 decision to de-regulate GE (DT) soybean and cotton played a role 
in the 2016 EPA’s decision to register the new versions of dicamba. If that was the 
case, it would need to be recognized that regulatory agencies are limited in their 
capacity to act autonomously (so as to advance the public interest) by the actions of 
other regulatory bodies who also have authority over that product or another product 
that is intended for use with it.
The regulation of new technological products presents a challenge for a third rea-
son. Specifically, if states choose to afford patent holders very broad rights, regula-
tory agencies may not be able to attend to their duties to advance the public interest. 
For instance, patent holders could claim that they should not be obligated to provide 
their products (including patented GE organisms, herbicides, or pesticides) to uni-
versity scientists, scientists working with civil society organizations, and even regu-
latory agency scientists for research purposes because that requirement is at odds 
with their patent rights.20
In response to that objection, a few things need to be said. The affording of such 
broad rights to developers of new technological products, in effect, gives them an 
epistemic monopoly over data, analyses, and evaluations of those artifacts. It under-
mines the ability of regulatory agencies to draw on a variety of sources for data, 
analyses, and assessments of new technological products’ safety and efficacy. That 
impacts their capacity to rigorously assess those products, which is part of their duty 
to advance the public interest. The state-enabled domination of regulatory agencies 
by product developers could have public health and environmental consequences, 
20 For a different perspective on patents for pesticides, see Timmermann (2015). He has argued that pes-
ticide effectiveness is a common human heritage and that heritage is undermined by chemical pesticides 
because such pesticides result in the target species developing pesticide resistance fairly quickly. Tim-
mermann makes the case that developers of pesticides should not be afforded (standard) patent rights 
because, unlike other inventions, the knowledge provided by pesticide developers in the patent applica-
tion becomes outdated prior to the expiration of the patent period. Invariably, the target species develop 
pesticide resistance, so not only is the knowledge (provided by the patent holder in the patent applica-
tion) not of relevance, the product loses its usefulness. Moreover, pesticide manufacturers benefit if farm-
ers overuse their products, although that puts at risk pesticide effectiveness (Timmermann, 2015, 14). 
(Farmers overuse pesticides and herbicides because target organisms have developed resistance to them 
(Lopez-Hernandez, 2020)). Timmmerman notes that in terms of profitability for agrochemical companies 
what matters is the good reputation of pesticides, “basically on how farmers think the pesticide will per-
form, not for the actual performance” (2015, 14).
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nationally and internationally. The actions of regulatory agencies can have very 
widespread significance.
It also needs to be pointed out that the patent objection is based on a fundamen-
tal misunderstanding about patent rights. Countries permit inventors to patent their 
novel inventions and thereby profit from them because the public interest will be 
served when, in return for the patent rights, they disclose how those inventions func-
tion and can be created and used (see, for instance, Shi (2008); Timmerman (2014); 
and especially patent expert Peter Drahos’ works). Patents are not a social good that 
takes precedence over all other concerns.
Historically, the scope of patent rights was determined by individual state 
actors. Over the last few decades, some powerful members of the World Trade 
Organization have aggressively pushed for the international harmonization of pat-
ent regimes and those patent laws strongly favor patent-holding corporate actors 
(Drahos, 1995; 2003).
However, depending on their power on the global stage, countries do tailor their 
national patent regimes to varying degrees. Germany, for instance, does not give 
patent holders the power to bar or determine what kind of research may be con-
ducted on their products (Biddle 2014, 20–21). In contrast, the USA affords patent 
holders much broader rights. Drawing on Waltz’s (2009) research about Monsanto, 
Syngenta, and Pioneer Hi-Bred limiting the kind of research US scientists could 
conduct on their products, Biddle (2014) notes that the USA choses to give patent 
holders the right to decide to whom they provide their products for research and 
under what conditions. Legal scholar Rebecca Bratspies (2017, 607) has examined 
the broad scope of Monsanto’s technology/stewardship agreement that are presum-
ably based on its US patent rights:
[U]ntil recently, Monsanto’s technology/stewardship agreements explicitly 
prohibited seed purchasers from conducting any research on the seeds.21 The 
agreements also prohibited a purchaser from supplying seeds to someone else 
for research purposes.22 As a result, there was no way for researchers to legally 
acquire seeds or conduct research without the explicit permission of the com-
pany involved. Researchers complained about needing to have “written per-
mission from the companies for any science involving their seed, even if it 
was commercially available.”23 To obtain this permission, researchers had to 
get the company to sign off on the research design.24 That gave the companies 
the power to choose who could study the crops and to dictate how the research 
would be conducted, giving them unfettered power to shape the information 
23 Bratspies (2017, 607) cites Johnson (2013), who quotes Elson Shields, a corn–insect scientist at Cor-
nell University.
24 Drawing on Pollack (2009) who cited an anonymous letter submitted to the EPA (Anonymous 2009), 
Bratspies (2017, 607) notes that “[I]n an unprecedented 2009 letter to EPA, twenty-six entomologists 
complained that the agricultural biotechnology companies were thwarting independent research on the 
effects of their GE crops.”
21 In support of that claim, Bratspies (2017, 607) cited term 4(j) of Monsanto’s 2015 Technology/Stew-
ardship Agreement (Monsanto 2015) as well as Waltz (2009, 880).
22 Monsanto (2015, 4(j)) and Waltz (2009, 880) (cited in Bratspies (2017, 607)).
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that would available.25 As a result, “[n]o truly independent research [could] be 
legally conducted on many critical questions,…unduly limit[ing]” the data that 
regulators had before them in making decisions about GE crops.26
Even more astonishing than the prior restrictions on academic research is the 
fact that these same research limitations extended to regulators.27 Indeed, it 
was only in 2010 that Monsanto and (USDA Agriculture Research Service) 
(ARS) negotiated a license that allowed the government—i.e., the regulators 
overseeing Monsanto—the freedom to conduct research without first asking 
Monsanto’s express permission for each individual experiment (my italics).28
The larger point here appears to be that if a country permits patent holding actors to 
determine the conditions under which research may be conducted on their products by 
regulatory agency scientists and third-party scientists and the results publicly dissemi-
nated, it, in effect, creates condition for the domination of regulatory agencies. It allows 
the patent holder to have an epistemic monopoly, which impairs efforts of regulatory 
agencies to conduct rigorous evaluations of new technological products so to determine 
their safety and efficacy. A state that affords overly broad patent rights undermines its 
own regulatory agencies’ efforts to advance the public interest.
Developers of technological products should welcome scrutiny of their products by 
third parties. It could help them identify serious problems early on and devise solutions 
for them. It could also help them decide whether they should try to bring those products 
to the market at all if they are fundamentally flawed or radically at odds with the terms 
under which a certain kind of technology may be used in a particular country.
8  Conclusion
This paper argued that regulatory agencies must advance the public interest as they reg-
ulate new technological products. To make that case, it drew on the 9th Circuit Court’s 
ruling against the EPA with regards to the commercial use of three newly developed 
lower volatility formulations of dicamba. The ruling has broad relevance for regulatory 
agencies in democracies. To foster the public interest, regulatory agencies must assess 
new technological products in a substantively and procedurally disinterested manner. 
Among other things, it means they must evaluate them by drawing on data, analyses, 
and evaluations from a variety of credible epistemic sources, rather than rely solely or 
primarily on sources that have a vested interest in them. Moreover, they should be par-
ticularly attentive to the analyses and assessments of the new technological products 
developed by those who would be most at risk from them or by those who represent 
such parties.
27 Citing Waltz (2009), Bratspies (2017, 607) notes that the “the 2009 anonymous public comment was, 
at least in part, comprised of ARS scientists”.
28 See footnote 27.
26 Bratspies (2017, 607) cites the anonymous comment on FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel (see foot-
note 24) in support of this claim.
25 Bratspies references the following quote from Waltz (2009, 880): “Seed companies can refuse a 
research request for any reason, and they get fairly inventive.”
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Relatedly, regulatory agencies should issue guidances instructing product develop-
ers to provide their products for study to third parties that are not funded or affiliated 
with them. For instances, university scientists and civil society organization scientists 
should be provided with the newly developed technological products so that they can 
analyze and evaluate them and provide their reports to regulatory agencies before they 
are commercialized. Regulatory agencies should have those studies and reports in hand 
as they consider whether the new technologies should be authorized for commercial 
use. Moreover, regulatory agency scientists (that have no ties or interaction with the 
product developer) should be able to conduct research on the products that they are 
evaluating, without needing the patent holder’s permission. Last, but not least, advanc-
ing the public interest requires that democratic states create conditions—nationally 
and internationally—such that regulatory agencies do not have to solely (or primarily) 
depend on the data, analyses, and evaluations provided to them by product developers.
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